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Roberts: Constitutional Law--An Invalid Exercise of the Police Power in th

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-AN INvALm EXERCISE OF THE POLICE
POWER IN Ti

REGULATION OF THE PRACTICE OF OPTOMETRY.

State ex rel. Board of Examiners in Optometry v. Lawton, 523
P.2d 1064 (Okla. 1974).

Plaintiff Lawton brought a declaratory judgment action to enjoin
the State Board of Examiners in Optometry from taking action against
him for his obvious violation of a state statute. In 1965, Dr. Lawton,
a licensed optometrist, located his office on the opposite side of the
hall from Lee Optical Company in a suburban shopping plaza. This
close proximity was unknown to either party at the time they signed
their leases. The Oklahoma Legislature subsequently passed a statute
which precluded an optomerist from practicing "his profession adjacent to or in such geographical proximity to a retail optical outlet, optical store, optical dispensary or any establishment where optical goods
and materials are purveyed to the public so as to induce patronage for
himself thereby."' This provision was enacted in 1971 as part of "an
Act relating to the practice of optometry"' for the purpose of raising
the practice of optometry to the highest ethical and professional level
by ridding the field of any taint of commercialism.' Section 597 of
the Act provides for criminal penalties as well as the sanction of revocaion of the optometrist's license.
Prior to the enactment of this legislation the Board of Optometry
had instituted proceedings to revoke Dr. Lawton's license under article
III, sections 5 and 6 of the Rules and Regulations of the Board of
Examiners in Optometry. 4 Dr. Lawton was joined with Dr. C.F. Sum1. OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 594 (1971).
2. OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, §§ 593-597 (1971).
3. OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 593 (1971).
4. OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, §§ 583, 585 (1961) provided the Board with authority to
make regulations and institute revocation proceedings for violations. The Board, comprised solely of optometrists, amended their Rules and Regulations to include the following:
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mers in State ex rel. Board of Examiners in Optometry v. Summers,'
and together they challenged the authority of the Board's revocation
of their licenses. The Summers court held that the Board's statutory
authority to promulgate rules was not so comprehensive as to allow for
the revocation of the optometrist's license for offenses enumerated in
a separate section of the title. 6 The enactment of section 594 into title
59 was merely a codification of article III, section 6 of the Board Rules.
The Lawton court relied on a similar decision of the Supreme
Court of Colorado, Colorado State Board of Optometric Examiners v.
Dixon,' in liberally construing the Oklahoma Declaratory Judgments
Act.8 This action was held to have been appropriately brought by a
person who potentially suffers the loss of profession or criminal prosecution. Dr. Lawton contended that the statute was unconstitutional because of the vagueness and ambiguity of its terms. He argued that
"adjacent" and "geographical proximity" lacked clear definition for application in varied circumstances and therefore violated the due process
clauses of the United States and Oklahoma Constitutions 9 for lack of
clear standards to gauge the individual's conduct. The Board of Optometry relied upon the mandate of Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.'0
In Williamson geographical location was held to be a possible consideration in the liberal use of the police power by the legislature.
This consideration had enough "rational relation" to the objective of
the legislation to be within the constitutional bounds."
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in rendering the unanimous decision accepted Dr. Lawton's argument and the reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court in Connally v. General Construction Co.' 2 In
Connally the Court held that a criminal statute must be sufficiently unequivocal in its proscription to satisfy due process. The lack of a fairly
5. No optometrist shall, with intent or purpose to induce patronage for
himself, practice optometry in such proximity to a retail optical outlet as to
induce the public to associate his practice with such retail optical outlet.
6. No optometrist shall knowingly allow or permit any person engaged
in or interested in the sale of optical goods, appliances or materials to solicit
business for him.
5. 487 P.2d 706 (Okla. 1971).
6. OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 944 (1971). The penalties for violations of this section
are criminal prosecution and civil injunction.
7. 165 Colo. 488, 440 P.2d 287 (1968).
8. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1651 (1971).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 7.

10. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
11. Id. at 491.

12. 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
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explicit definition in the terms "adjacent" and "geographical proximity"
resulted in their failure to meet this standard. Williamson was distinguished because it did not define the possible uses of geographical location with any particularity.
Although the court in Lawton addressed itself mainly to the
proximity question, many of the same "commercialism" arguments
have been raised concerning the validity of the regulation of corporations in the field of optometry. Lawmaking bodies have long been divided on the extent to which regulation of optometry is necessary to
adequately protect the public. The basic issue is whether a mercantile
corporation is in effect practicing optometry when it either employs
or leases office space to an optometrist. The main conceptual difference is whether the practice of optometry is characterized as a "learned
profession' ' 13 similar to medicine, or a "skilled calling"' 4 similar to accountancy. This divergent outlook is displayed in the statutory proscriptions against corporate involvement in optometry. The "learned
profession" view is generally rejected in favor of a trade classification
where the presence of leasing or employment arrangements are held
not to constitute practicing optometry.'
In Silver v. Lansburgh &
6
Bro.,' a mercantile corporation engaged licensed optometrists in its
retail optical department. An injunction against this arrangement was
denied on the grounds that the profession of optometry was similar to
that of engineers and accountants and dissimilar to the medical and
legal professions. The optometrist's duties were characterized as
merely a technical observation without the corresponding confidential
relationship found in the professions. It was conceded that certain
standards should be imposed but that corporations could maintain such
standards as readily as individuals. The thrust of this decision was
that the purpose of the statute involved,' 7 to protect the public from
inexpertness by insuring competent care for the eye, was achieved in
the employment of licensed optometrists.
13. Silver v. Lansburgh & Bros., 72 App. D.C. 77, 111 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
14. State ex rel. Harris v. Kindy Optical Co., 235 Wis. 498, 292 N.W. 283 (1940).
15. See Silver v. Lansburgh & Bro., 72 App. D.C. 77, 111 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir.
1940); Georgia State Exam. in Optom. v. Friedman's Jwlrs, 183 Ga. 669, 189 S.E. 238
(1936); Klein v. Rosen, 327 Il. App. 375, 64 N.E.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1936); State v.
Goodman, 206 Minn. 203, 288 N.W. 157 (1939); State ex rel. McKittrick v. Gate City
Optical Co., 339 Mo. 427, 97 S.W.2d 89 (1936); Golding v. Schubach Optical Co., 93
Utah 32, 70 P.2d 871 (1937); State ex rel. Harris v. Kindy Optical Co., 235 Wis. 498,
292 N.W. 283 (1940).
16. 72 App. D.C. 77, 111 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
17. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-501 et seq. (1973).
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Recently, in Dixon v. Zick,' I the Colorado Supreme Court in-

validated an optometry board regulation, similar to the present Oklahoma statute. 9 Although the sole issue before the Dixon court was
whether the regulation exceeded the statutory authority of the agency,
Justice Kelley commented that:

No reason has been suggested, and we can find none, as to
why those conducting a commercial or mercantile business
should be singled out by the Board from the broad class of

potential landlords from whom a licensed optometrist may
not lease space in which to practice his profession. There is
no evidence that there is, in a rental relationship between an
optometrist and a commercial or mercantile establishment,
any inherent evil or a propensity to violate the statutorily proscribed conduct of an optometrist or that the conduct of the
practice on such premises affects in any manner the public
health, safety and welfare. We can find no reasonable basis
for Rule II in the Act.20
In Oklahoma, 2 ' and other jurisdictions, 2 2 corporations are prohibited
from either employing or leasing office space to licensed optometrists.
Generally, this view is based on the theory that optometry is a learned
profession and that such arrangements constitute practicing optometry
without being licensed.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Semler v. Oregon
State Board of Dental Examiners,2 3 provided the authority for those

states which chose to isolate the practice of optometry to the sole practitioner. In Semler, the Court held that the legislature has the discretionary power to regulate the "ethics" of a profession by deciding which
practices will generally be unscrupulous, and therefore prohibit such
18. 179 Colo. 278, 500 P.2d 130 (1972). This case is the sequel to Colo. State
Bd. of Optom. Exam. v. Dixon, 165 Colo.488, 440 P.2d 287 (1968).
19. OKLA. STAT.tit.
59, § 596 (1971); OKL.A. STAT. tit.
59, § 944 (1971).
20. 500 P.2d at 133-34.
21. OKLA. STAT. tit.
59, § 944 (1971).
22. See Funk Jewelry Co. v. State, 46 Ariz. 348, 50 P.2d 945 (1935); Lieberman
v. Conn. State Bd. of Exam. in Optom., 130 Conn. 344, 34 A.2d 213 (1943); State
ex reL Beck v. Goldman Jewelry Co., 142 Kan. 881, 51 P.2d 995 (1935); Kendall v.
Beiling, 295 Ky. 782, 175 S.W.2d 489 (Ct. App. 1943); McMurdo v. Getter, 298 Mass.
363, 10 N.E.2d 139 (1937); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. State Bd. of Optom., 213 Miss.
710, 57 So. 2d 726 (1952); State ex reL Sisemore v. Standard Optical Co., 182 Or.
452, 188 P.2d 309 (1947); Ezell v. Ritholz, 188 S.C. 39, 198 S.E. 419 (1938); State
ex rel. Loser v. National Optical Stores Co., 189 Tenn. 433, 225 S.W.2d 263 (1949);
Ritholz v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 339, 35 S.E.2d 210 (1945); State ex rel. Standard
Optical Co. v. Super. Ct., 17 Wash. 2d 323, 135 P.2d 839 (1943); Eisensmith v. Buhl
Optical Co., 115 W. Va. 776, 178 S.E. 695 (1934),
23. 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
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practices for the protection of the public even if it hinders honest prac-

tices.
This application of the police power was applied to optometry in
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. 24 Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous Court, analogized office rentals to optometrists in commercial establishments to the prohibition of a corporation practicing dentistry.
Both laws have the purpose of raising the treatments to professional
25
levels and reducing the possibility of the "taint of commercialism".
Under this mandate, measures have been enacted and validated
prohibiting solicitation and advertising; 26 employment of optometrists
by corporations, partnerships, firms or any other unlicensed individual;2 7 and leasing space to optometrists in mercantile establishments.28
The prohibition against corporate employment of optometrists has been
based on rationales ranging from the requirement that each optometrist
must practice under his own name,2 9 to the disability of the corporate
entity to meet the licensing requirements.3 0 The primary objection
(despite separate statutory proscriptions) 31 is that illegal rebates or
kickback agreements will abound and the corporation will induce patronage to the optometrist.
The public policy of the State of Oklahoma includes the regulation
of optometry to insure that the public receives the best possible visual
care. 32 Obviously, some regulation is necessary to protect the public
from fraudulent, deceptive, and misleading advertising; however, a less
than total ban has presumedly been effective in other jurisdictions.
The prohibition against the mercantile corporation employing an optometrist should be questioned in light of the experience of other states
which are achieving the desired result without such a proscription.
This prohibition has the detrimental effect of denying to the consumer
the possibility of realizing competitive, mass-market savings that a cor24. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
25. Id. at 491.
26. Eisensmith v. Buhl Optical Co., 115 W. Va. 776, 178 S.E. 695 (1934); OKrA.
STAT. tit. 59, § 943 (1971).
27. State ex rel. Beck v. Goldman Jewelry Co., 142 Kan. 881, 51 P.2d 995 (1935);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 944 (1971).
28. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 133a (1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 1504
(1971); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 944 (1971).
29. Eisensmith v. Buhl Optical Co., 115 W. Va. 776, 178 S.E. 695 (1934); KAN.
STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 1504 (1971); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 942 (1971).
30. State ex rel. Beck v. Goldman Jewelry Co., 142 Kan. 881, 51 P.2d 995 (1935).
31. OKLA. STAr. tit. 59, § 944 (1971).
32. OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 593 (1971); O,'A. STAT. tit. 59, § 941 (1971).
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